I mean, really. Don't we have enough people telling each other off these days? Look at Turkey. They are p***ed at the US House Congressional Committee for passing a (non-binding) resolution saying that Turkey committed genocide against Armenians about a hundred years ago. So Turkey, wagging its finger at the US, threatens to block access to an air base.
Then there is China. China is p***ed at the US for giving the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama. Warning of serious retaliation, China pulled out of a six-nation meeting that something to do with the Iranian nuclear program.
Then there are the taxi drivers in DC. They are p***ed at Mayor Adrian Fenty for passing a law that requires DC cabs to have meters. I know what you are thinking. What?! DC cabs don't have meters?! You see they operate based on a quaint zone system. Regular customers who have memorized the zone boundaries can save a buck or two by hiring a cab across the street. Nuts, I say.
In any case, I am sure no DC resident - Turkish, Armenian, Chinese or American - wants DC's zone system to persist!
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Saturday, October 06, 2007
The wheels keep turning round and round ...
To say that the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal has gone through its fair share of ups and downs is an understatement. In July '05, the leaders of the two countries took a revolutionary step when they announced the broad terms of the proposed nuclear co-operation agreement. Cameras clicked, people smiled (some with disbelief), and the wheels of legal machinery began creaking forward. In a world where even the incremental, evolutionary changes are contested, it should come as no surprise that this revolutionary deal would face severe challenges in the months and years ahead.
Briefly, the agreement promised India access to nuclear fuel/technology that has long been denied to her chiefly, because of (a) refusal to join NPT and (b) conducting the nuclear tests in 1998. In return, 14 of the 22 nuclear reactors in India would be placed under international safeguards in perpetuity. You can read more about the deal here and here.
As early as the end of '05, some US lawmakers like Sen. Richard Lugar raised their doubts, which could seriously jeopardize the deal. In his prepared comments, he made it clear that he did not like that the Congress had not been consulted prior to the deal. The subtext of his remarks was that he did not trust the Indians' offering of "voluntary" compliances. He sought US control over any technology/fuel that was being considered. Moreover, he wanted more, i.e., all nuclear reactors in India under safeguards.
Then in early '06, the New York times gave a two thumbs down to the deal, before Bush's visit to India. Other hoped that the President's visit would in part, nudge the deal along. Around the same time, noted Indian scientists like Dr. Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Dr. Banerjee, director of BARC issued their support to the deal. This was echoed by several policy experts in the US and abroad like Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution, Walter Andersen at JHU, Frank Wisner and William Clark, former US ambassadors to India and importantly, Dr. El-Baradei, the head of the IAEA.
Within a couple of months after President Bush's India visit, the Indian Americans began galvanizing support for the deal. This was perhaps one of the first times that the community had managed to organize itself to the extent it did. Irrespective of the fate of the deal, one hopes that the Indian-American community will strengthen its newly-found confidence and voice.
By the middle of that year, some in the Indian scientific community voiced their opposition to the deal amidst calls of India becoming subservient to the US. At the same time, India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was jetting around winning support for the deal. Within the end of the year, countries like UK and Italy would offer support even though Australia dilly-dallied. China, as expected, did not welcome the proposed agreement.
In October '06, North Korea rocked the boat by testing a nuclear bomb. And the shadow of the mushroom cloud threatened to engulf the Indo-US deal. That did not happen.
That brings us to the present year. 2007. The discussion in some sections of the Indian media, notably the Indian Express, got very detailed. Experts started analyzing the deal with a fine comb. Amazingly, the no-nonsense, technical discussion thrived in the newspaper. And this, in a country, where printing titillating pictures in the Times of India passes for journalism!
Prakash Karat, the articulate communist in India, issued his shrill opposition to the deal. For a while the left party opposition led by Karat threatened the survival of the Singh administration. That fear seems to have abated even as cooler heads prevailed on the left end of the spectrum. Notably, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee the West Bengal Chief Minister and Jyoti Basu, its former CM unequivocally expressed their support for the deal. Amidst this hooplah, Prime Minister Singh made a an astonishing statement -- one that could come from either a visionary or one who had nothing to lose. Rubbishing Karat's stand, the Prime Minister said that history would judge the deal favorably. Now that takes some courage!
Just as the left worries were starting to subside in India and the Indian administration soldiered on with their business, the next step was launching into discussions with the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG).
And in what can only be described as deja vu, some lawmakers in the US (this time, the House) and the New York Times upped their ante and have come out against the deal. The House issued a non-binding resolution, which essentially seeks to do exactly what Karat wanted. Throw a spanner into the machinery, jam the wheels and bring it to a halt.
Dr. El Baradei will be in India on a 3-day visit shortly. But the officials are tight-lipped about the NSG discussions -- whether indeed, there will be any discussions. The Left parties are meeting around the same time. Oh, the drama! But it is difficult to imagine that Dr. El Baradei will go all the way just to shake hands and see the sights.
The picture is the US is shaping up more unfavorably. The next few weeks are sure to be taken up in talking about the President's veto of the SCHIP act and the Congress' attempt to override the veto. And of course, there is the Iraq war. Along with the immigration battle, the proposed deal may simply be passed on to the next President. As far as the nuclear deal goes, passing the buck would effectively kill the deal.
Briefly, the agreement promised India access to nuclear fuel/technology that has long been denied to her chiefly, because of (a) refusal to join NPT and (b) conducting the nuclear tests in 1998. In return, 14 of the 22 nuclear reactors in India would be placed under international safeguards in perpetuity. You can read more about the deal here and here.
As early as the end of '05, some US lawmakers like Sen. Richard Lugar raised their doubts, which could seriously jeopardize the deal. In his prepared comments, he made it clear that he did not like that the Congress had not been consulted prior to the deal. The subtext of his remarks was that he did not trust the Indians' offering of "voluntary" compliances. He sought US control over any technology/fuel that was being considered. Moreover, he wanted more, i.e., all nuclear reactors in India under safeguards.
Then in early '06, the New York times gave a two thumbs down to the deal, before Bush's visit to India. Other hoped that the President's visit would in part, nudge the deal along. Around the same time, noted Indian scientists like Dr. Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Dr. Banerjee, director of BARC issued their support to the deal. This was echoed by several policy experts in the US and abroad like Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution, Walter Andersen at JHU, Frank Wisner and William Clark, former US ambassadors to India and importantly, Dr. El-Baradei, the head of the IAEA.
Within a couple of months after President Bush's India visit, the Indian Americans began galvanizing support for the deal. This was perhaps one of the first times that the community had managed to organize itself to the extent it did. Irrespective of the fate of the deal, one hopes that the Indian-American community will strengthen its newly-found confidence and voice.
By the middle of that year, some in the Indian scientific community voiced their opposition to the deal amidst calls of India becoming subservient to the US. At the same time, India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was jetting around winning support for the deal. Within the end of the year, countries like UK and Italy would offer support even though Australia dilly-dallied. China, as expected, did not welcome the proposed agreement.
In October '06, North Korea rocked the boat by testing a nuclear bomb. And the shadow of the mushroom cloud threatened to engulf the Indo-US deal. That did not happen.
That brings us to the present year. 2007. The discussion in some sections of the Indian media, notably the Indian Express, got very detailed. Experts started analyzing the deal with a fine comb. Amazingly, the no-nonsense, technical discussion thrived in the newspaper. And this, in a country, where printing titillating pictures in the Times of India passes for journalism!
Prakash Karat, the articulate communist in India, issued his shrill opposition to the deal. For a while the left party opposition led by Karat threatened the survival of the Singh administration. That fear seems to have abated even as cooler heads prevailed on the left end of the spectrum. Notably, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee the West Bengal Chief Minister and Jyoti Basu, its former CM unequivocally expressed their support for the deal. Amidst this hooplah, Prime Minister Singh made a an astonishing statement -- one that could come from either a visionary or one who had nothing to lose. Rubbishing Karat's stand, the Prime Minister said that history would judge the deal favorably. Now that takes some courage!
Just as the left worries were starting to subside in India and the Indian administration soldiered on with their business, the next step was launching into discussions with the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG).
And in what can only be described as deja vu, some lawmakers in the US (this time, the House) and the New York Times upped their ante and have come out against the deal. The House issued a non-binding resolution, which essentially seeks to do exactly what Karat wanted. Throw a spanner into the machinery, jam the wheels and bring it to a halt.
Dr. El Baradei will be in India on a 3-day visit shortly. But the officials are tight-lipped about the NSG discussions -- whether indeed, there will be any discussions. The Left parties are meeting around the same time. Oh, the drama! But it is difficult to imagine that Dr. El Baradei will go all the way just to shake hands and see the sights.
The picture is the US is shaping up more unfavorably. The next few weeks are sure to be taken up in talking about the President's veto of the SCHIP act and the Congress' attempt to override the veto. And of course, there is the Iraq war. Along with the immigration battle, the proposed deal may simply be passed on to the next President. As far as the nuclear deal goes, passing the buck would effectively kill the deal.
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